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PREVIEW: Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue: 
Does Montana’s Blaine Amendment Violate the Free Exercise 
Clause? 
Katy Lindberg 
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument 
on this matter Wednesday, January 22, 2020, at 10:00 am, in the 
Supreme Court Building, Washington D.C. Richard D. Komer is 
likely to appear for Petitioners, and Adam G. Unikowsky is likely to 
appear for Respondents. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case raises the issue of whether the Free Exercise and 
Establishment clauses of the First Amendment, and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, require a state to 
allow generally available and religiously neutral student aid to 
students attending a religious school.1 The United States Supreme 
Court’s decision on the Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Montana’s Blaine Amendment could have important implications 
for states with constitutional prohibitions on state aid to religious 
schools.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2018, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated a 2015 tax 
program that provided a dollar for dollar tax credit, up to $150, for 
donations to Student Scholarship Organizations, which provided 
scholarships to students attending private schools, including 
religious schools.2  Justice McKinnon, writing for the majority, held 
the Program, allowed the Legislature to indirectly pay tuition and 
therefore impermissibly aided religious schools under Montana’s 
Blaine Amendment, Article X, Section 6.3 Because “the 
overwhelming majority” of the schools receiving the scholarships 
 
1 See Brief for Petitioners, at i, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue 
(U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-1195); Brief of Respondents at i, Espinoza v. 
Montana Dept. of Revenue (U.S. Nov. 8, 2019) (No. 18-1195). 
2 Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603, 606 
(Mont. 2018). 
3 Id. at 612. 
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were religious schools,4 and because taxpayers could not direct 
funds to a specific school, the court found the Legislature could not 
ensure the funds went only to secular education.5 Further, if a 
religious school did receive funds, there was no way to know “where 
the secular purpose ended, and the sectarian began.”6  
 
Justice Gustafson concurred, agreeing the Program violated 
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.7 Justice Baker dissented, asserting a tax credit is not 
an indirect appropriation.8 Justice Rice also dissented, asserting the 
Program was neutral with respect to religion, and thus constitutional 




Petitioners argue Montana’s application of Article X, 
Section 6 violated the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of 
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.10   
Petitioners assert that Montana’s application of Article X, 
Section 6 violates the Free Exercise clause because it prohibited all 
religious groups from receiving funding under the tax credit 
program.11 Petitioners argue the invalidation of the program 
discriminated against their religious beliefs, conduct, and status.12 
Further, because religious schools were excluded from the program, 
the schools also faced discrimination for their beliefs, status and 
conduct.13 Petitioners urge the Court to examine the lower court’s 
 
4 12 out of 13 schools that benefited from the program were religious 
schools.  
5 Id. at 613. 
6 Id. (citing State ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10 of Deer Lodge 
County, 472 P.2d 1013, 1021 (Mont. 1970)). 
7 Id. at 620-21 (Gustafson, J., concurring). Justice Sandefur also 
concurred.  
8 Id. at 626-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
9 Id. at 632-33 (Rice, J., dissenting).  
10 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 13. 
11  Id. at 26–28. 
12 Id. at 17–19. 
13 Id. at 19–20. 
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application of the Article X, Section 6 under strict scrutiny and that 
no sufficient compelling state interest exists.14 
Additionally, Petitioners argue Article X, Section 6 violates 
the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection clause because it draws an 
impermissible line between students attending religious schools and 
secular schools and it discriminates against students seeking a 
religious education.15 Petitioners assert that because Article X, 
Section 6 was enacted out of animus toward Catholics, Montana’s 
application of the clause violated the Equal Protection Clause.16 
Several amici argue for total invalidation of Article X, Section 6 
under the Equal Protection Clause as well.17   
Finally, Petitioners argue Article X, Section 6 as applied 
demonstrates prohibited state hostility toward religion, violating the 
Establishment Clause.18 The lower court’s “unbending commitment 
to secularism . . . tramples upon [petitioner’s] religious rights.”19 
b. Respondents 
The Montana Department of Revenue’s primary argument 
centers around the Free Exercise Clause.20 Because the lower court 
invalidated the Program in its entirety, the Department argues there 
was no prohibition on, or coercion of, religious practice.21 The 
Department also asserts that Article X, Section 6 violates neither the 
Equal Protection Clause nor the Establishment Clause.22 
Addressing Free Exercise concerns, Respondents 
distinguish the present facts from those in Trinity Lutheran, arguing 
 
14 Id. at 20–21. 
15 Id. at 29–31. 
16 Id. at 44–45. 
17 See generally Amicus Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
at 4–17, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue (U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-
1195); Amicus Brief for Senators Steve Daines, et al. at 27–30, Espinoza v. 
Montana Dept. of Revenue (U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-1195); Amicus Brief for 
the Montana Family Foundation at 12–13, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue 
(U.S. Sep. 11, 2019) (No. 18-1195). 
18 Id. at 14. 
19 Id. at 47. 
20 See Brief of Respondents, supra note 1 at 10–49. 
21 Id. at 11–13. 
22 Id. at 49–55. 
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neither the lower court decision, nor Article X, Section 6 constitute 
a prohibition on the free exercise of religion.23  Unlike Trinity 
Lutheran, Respondents argue the lower court’s decision was not 
coercive because all groups stopped receiving aid through the 
program—regardless of their religious affiliation.24   
Finally, Respondents address Equal Protection and 
Establishment Clause concerns. Because the lower court decision 
invalidated the program, denying aid to all schools, Respondents 
argue there is no unequal treatment, and therefore no Equal 
Protection Clause violation.25 Additionally, Respondents challenge 
Petitioner’s animus claim by discussing the history and purpose of 
Article X, Section 6, and similar clauses across the country, and 
explaining the clauses were enacted not out of bigotry, but to protect 
religious freedom.26   Further, Respondents argue Article X, Section 
6 as applied protects religious freedom rather than enforcing 
secularism, and does not violate the Establishment Clause because 
it is not hostile toward religion.27 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s decision will likely turn on whether Article X, 
Section 6, as applied to invalidate the Program, served to exclude 
religious schools from a generally available benefit, violating the 
Free Exercise Clause.  
Arguably, this a strange case for the Court to make a shift in 
its Free Exercise jurisprudence. Petitioners argue Montana’s 
application of Article X, Section 6 violated the Free Exercise 
Clause. Yet, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program 
completely, so Petitioners are left to argue that the Court should 
require Montana to enforce a program that, under the Montana 
Supreme Court’s interpretation, violates the Montana 
Constitution.28 Respondents assert such action by the Court would 
grossly violate federalism because it would remove a state’s choice 
in determining whether state funded school-choice programs can 
 
23 Id. at 13. 
24 Id. at 14. 
25 Id. at 50–51. 
26 See Id. at 17–36. 
27 Id. at 52–54. 
28 Id. at 46. 
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fund religious schools.29 Further, Respondents argue the Court 
should not force Montana to administer a law that violates its own 
constitution.30  
If the Court agrees with Petitioners and finds Montana’s 
application of Article X, Section 6 violated the Free Exercise 
Clause, Blaine Amendments around the country could be rendered 
toothless.31  Many states rely on their constitution’s no-aid clauses 
to strike down school-choice programs providing aid for religious 
education.32 If Montana’s application of Article X, Section 6 
violates the Free Exercise Clause, states that wish to limit state aid 
to religious schools under their no-aid clauses may have their hands 
tied.33 
Many amici have asserted that clauses like Article X, Section 
6 violate the Free Exercise Clause, and have asked the Court to 
invalidate Blaine Amendments as a whole. 34 If the Court invalidates 
Article X, Section 6, similar clauses existing in 37 state constitutions 
could also be invalidated.35 Many of these clauses were enacted in 
the early 1800s,36 and it would be unprecedented for the Court to 
overturn these provisions.37 
This case is flanked by two crucial religious freedom cases: 
Locke v. Davey38 and Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer.39 The Locke court recognized there is “play in the joints” 
between the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, and decided 
a state’s choice to not fund religious instruction fell within this 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 46–47. 
31 Id. at 44.  
32 See Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1184 (Ariz. 2009); Bush v. Holmes, 
886 So. 2d 340, 366 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2004). 
33 Brief of Respondents, supra note 1 at 44. 
34 See generally Amicus Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty 
at 4–17, supra note 17; Amicus Brief for Senators Steve Daines, et al. at 27–30, 
supra note 17; Amicus Brief for the Montana Family Foundation at 12–13, supra 
note 17. 
35 Id. at 41. 
36 Id. 
37 Brief of Respondents, supra note 1 at 44. 
38 540 U. S. 712 (2004). 
39 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017). 
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gap.40 Currently, there is a circuit split about how much “play” exists 
between the “joints” of the religious clauses. While some courts 
interpreted Locke to allow states to exclude all religious schools 
from aid programs,41 other courts held religious schools should 
receive aid under Locke.42  
More recently, the Court in Trinity Lutheran held a state 
cannot deny a generally available benefit to a church without 
violating the Free Exercise Clause.43 However, the majority 
specifically noted in a footnote that their analysis did not address 
“religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.”44 
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch did not join this footnote, asserting a 
state cannot discriminate based on religious use or religious status.45   
This case gives the Court an opportunity to expand on, 
and/or distinguish between, Locke and Trinity Lutheran, resolving 
whether Trinity Lutheran’s holding extends to religious uses of state 
aid. With a conservative majority, the court seems poised to expand 
upon Trinity Lutheran and prohibit states from denying generally 
available aid to religious schools for religious education. This 
outcome could render Blaine Amendments across the country 
useless or could even invalidate such provisions entirely. The extent 
of the Court’s decision will likely come down to Chief Justice 
Roberts. 
While the Petitioners primarily focus on the Free Exercise 
Clause, they also assert Equal Protection and Establishment clause 
violations.46 Whether Montana’s application of Article X, Section 6 
violated the Equal Protection Clause depends on the Court’s 
interpretation of the clause’s history, specifically whether it 
“represents a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
 
40 Locke, at 719. 
41 See Eulitt ex rel. Eulitt v. Me. Dept. of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 355 (1st 
Cir. 2004); Anderson v. Town of Durham, 895 A.2d 944, 961 (Me. 2006). 
42 See Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1258 
(10th Cir. 2008); Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 780 (7th Cir. 
2010).  
43 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc., at 2022. 
44 Id. at 2024 n.3.  
45 Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part). 
46 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 28. 
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group.”47 If the Court finds it was, it is likely to conclude Montana’s 
application of the clause, or the clause itself, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause because the state’s differing treatment of students 
attending religious and non-religious schools was “born out of 
animosity.”48  
The Establishment Clause argument also hinges on whether 
Montana’s application of Article X, Section 6 represents 
impermissible hostility towards religion.49 The Establishment 
Clause prohibits states from actively supporting or hindering the 
exercise of religion.50 If the Court determines that Montana’s 
application of Article X, Section 6, or the clause itself, “foster[ed] a 
pervasive . . . hostility to religion,”51 it will overturn Montana’s 
decision under the Establishment Clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision has the potential to settle the post-
Locke debate of how much “play” exists between the Free Exercise 
and Establishment clauses, and whether the “play” allows states to 
exclude religious schools from receiving state aid. If the Court 
decides Article X, Section 6 as applied by the Montana Supreme 
Court violated the Free Exercise Clause, the decision could have 
large implications for the 37 states with no-aid clauses. 
 
 
47 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 40–44; Brief for 
Petitioners, supra note 1, at 31–45. 
48 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). 
49 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 1, at 45–46. 
50 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520, 532 (1993).  
51 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 
2525 (1995). 
 
